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Abstract
We study the problem of collaborative machine learning mar-
kets where multiple parties can achieve improved perfor-
mance on their machine learning tasks by combining their
training data. We discuss desired properties for these machine
learning markets in terms of fair revenue distribution and po-
tential threats, including data replication. We then instantiate
a collaborative market for cases where parties share a com-
mon machine learning task and where parties’ tasks are dif-
ferent. Our marketplace incentivizes parties to submit high
quality training and true validation data. To this end, we in-
troduce a novel payment division function that is robust-to-
replication and customized output models that perform well
only on requested machine learning tasks. In experiments, we
validate the assumptions underlying our theoretical analysis
and show that these are approximately satisfied for commonly
used machine learning models.
1 Introduction
One of the main obstacles for training well-performing ma-
chine learning models is the limited availability of suf-
ficiently diverse labeled training data. However, the data
needed to train good models often exists but is not easy to
leverage as it is distributed and owned by multiple parties.
For instance, in the medical domain, important data about
patients that could be used for learning diagnostic support
systems for cancer might be in possession of different hos-
pitals, each of which holding different data, (e.g., from a
specific geographical region with different demographics).
Typically, by pooling the available data, the hospitals could
train better machine learning models for their application
than they could using only their own data. As all hospi-
tals would benefit from a better machine learning model ob-
tained through data sharing, there is a need for collaborative
machine learning.
Naturally, this type of collaboration raises questions in
terms of how to incentivize parties to participate in such
a collaborative machine learning effort. Unfortunately, in
many applications there is a clear and natural incentive for
parties to provide quality data or share their data to begin
with. Financially rewarding parties to incentivize participa-
tion seems to be natural in such cases but has to be done
with great care. For example, a fixed price per data point
Figure 1: Collaborative marketplace setup.
could motivate parties to gather large amounts of low quality
or fake data if there is no mechanism to control data quality.
Another reason that may dis-incentivize parties from sharing
data could stem from privacy and integrity concerns regard-
ing the use of party’s data once it is shared. For example,
once a party’s data is released it can be easily reused or sold.
To overcome these challenges and enable collaborative
machine learning in the outlined setting, there is a need for a
secure machine learning marketplace for joint model train-
ing that guarantees fair incentives for participation and en-
sures secure data handling. In this work, we propose a cloud-
based collaborative machine learning platform accessible to
parties for submitting data and machine learning tasks. Sub-
mitted training data represents the data that a party is willing
to contribute/sell, while submitting the validation data can
be seen as a specification of the machine learning model a
party is willing to buy. After a trade in this market, a partic-
ipating party obtains a model trained on the data available
to the market and customized for its task. Crucially, there
is no sharing of data and parties are only provided this cus-
tomized model (or query interface). As a result, only infor-
mation relevant to the validation task is released through the
model, limiting the possibility of copying and reusing the
data for other tasks. Such markets allow multiple parties to
jointly train machine learning models based on the training
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data provided by all of the parties and achieve improved per-
formance on their own tasks. Parties pay to the market for
the improvement on their validation tasks and get paid by
the market for the contribution of their training data to the
tasks of others. The market can support a single validation
task scenario, for example, where hospitals bring together
their data to train a single model for detecting cancer. Fur-
thermore, it also supports scenarios where one’s data can
contribute to multiple tasks. An overview of our envisioned
marketplace is shown in Figure 1.
Our market is enabled by three main components: 1. Data
valuation. Each model in the market is trained on the data
that is best suited for the specified validation task. Similar
to recent and concurrent work (Jia et al. 2019; Ghorbani and
Zou 2019) we can use Shapley values (Shapley 1953), a so-
lution concept from game theory discussed later, to match
data to tasks. 2. Customized model training. We ensure that
the model that a party receives is only suited for its own task
but not the other tasks available on the market. As a result
each party is incentivized to provide its true validation task.
3. Payment division. Each party receives a reward propor-
tional to how useful its data is for training other models. We
again use Shapley values, however, in this case to determine
fair payoffs.
One of the key challenges in designing such data market-
places comes from the very nature of data, i.e., free replica-
tion. This means that the reward of a party submitting copies
of the same dataset should not be more than the party sub-
mitting it once. Indeed the authors of (Agarwal, Dahleh, and
Sarkar 2019) also point out that, if used naively for machine
learning, Shapley value is not robust to replication (albeit in
a different market setup than ours). We design a market that
is robust-to-replication. The key idea behind our approach is
to allow a party to contribute data only if it also submits a
validation task for which it requires a trained model. Sub-
mitting a task, in turn, requires a participation fee. Hence,
for every replica, a party has to pay a participation fee that
depends on its validation task. As a result, the fee it pays for
the improvement on its task balances the payoff it gets from
the use of its training data.
Finally, we ensure that our cloud-based market is secure
and can be trusted by the parties. That is, the market itself
cannot resell, copy or release the data or the trained models.
Such a market can be instantiated using secure hardware,
such as Intel SGX (Hoekstra et al. 2013), which allows par-
ties to submit their data encrypted and ensure that it is only
decrypted and processed in secure enclaves and data is al-
ways encrypted in memory. It also provides attestation ca-
pabilities that parties can use to verify the integrity of the
market (e.g., that the data was used only to train specific
models and was not copied in plaintext outside of an en-
clave). See (Ohrimenko et al. 2016) for details.
We summarize our contribution as follows:
1. Marketplace Definition: We introduce a collaborative
marketplace to sell data and buy machine learning models
for learning single and multiple validation tasks.
2. Payment Division: We propose a novel and robust-to-
replication payment division function.
3. Customized model training: We propose to release cus-
tomized models to each party and not data in order to pre-
vent malicious parties from reselling the data while incen-
tivizing them to submit honest validation tasks (which in
our market can be seen as an indirect bid on the data).
4. Evaluation: We empirically evaluate the properties of our
marketplace. Our experimental results confirm that our
marketplace generates fair payoffs, customized models
and is robust to replication.
2 Background and Notation
Machine Learning Models and Evaluation. In super-
vised machine learning, we often consider training of mod-
els for regression or classification tasks, i.e., learning of
a prediction function M : Ω → Rk or M : Ω → [K],
respectively, where Ω is some input space, k ∈ N, and
[K] = {1, . . . ,K}. We introduce concepts for classifica-
tion problems only but the same concepts apply to regres-
sion problems. The model M is a part of some hypoth-
esis space H, e.g., the set of one layer neural-networks
with a fixed number of hidden neurons and sigmoid acti-
vations. These functions are learned from labeled training
data X , i.e., collections/sets of tuples of the form (ω, z),
where z ∈ [K] for classification. Learning in that context
commonly refers to minimizing a sample-wise loss function
l : Ω×[K]→ R, e.g., the cross-entropy loss, overloading no-
tation:M(X ) = arg minM′∈H 1|X |
∑
(ω,z)∈X l(M′(ω), z).
The goal of the learning process is to identify functionsM
that perform well on unseen data, i.e., test data, and, for
instance, achieve good classification accuracy. As a proxy,
for estimating the performance on test data, we use valida-
tion data V . The average classification performance on the
validation data is G(V,M(X )) = 1|V|
∑
(ω,z)∈V 1M(ω)=z ,
where 1 is the indicator function. Clearly, the performance
measure is application dependent and can, for instance, also
be the RMSE, ranking accuracy, etc. We refer to G as (per-
formance) gain function.
Properties of G . In the paper and for simplicity, we as-
sume an idealized non-negative gain function G and ideal-
ized dependencies of the model on the training data. For
training datasets X ,X ′ we assume that:
(i) replicated data does not change performance:
∀X ,X ′ : M(X ) =M(X ⊕ X );
(ii) monotonicty: G(V,M(X ))) ≤ G(V,M(X ⊕ X ′)));
(iii) supermodularity1: G(V,M(X ∪ {x})) −
G(V,M(X )) ≤ G(V,M(X ′∪{x}))−G(V,M(X ′))
for X ⊆ X ′ and x 6∈ X ′;
(iv) boundedness: G(V,M(X )) ≤ 1.
Here, (i) captures that duplication of training data does not
change the learned model. This is, for instance, true for 1-
NN classifiers; (ii) characterizes that additional data either
improves or does not change the performance; (iii) captures
1In our theoretical analysis, we show that supermodularity in
combination with our other assumptions is sufficient to prove that
our marketplace instantiations in §4 are robust to data replication
as introduced in §3.1. However, it is not a necessary condition.
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the collaborative market setting where each party provides
complementary data that contributes towards a ML task even
in the presence of other parties’ data.
Shapley Values for Fair Payoffs. Consider a (machine
learning) task which M parties M = {1, . . . ,M} aim to
solve with a joint effort. To quantify the value of the contri-
bution of each party towards solving the task, we consider a
characteristic function v : 2M → R. For every set S ⊆ M
of parties, v(S) quantifies how well the parties in S can
solve the task, e.g., v(S) could be the prediction accuracy
of the best model the parties in S can train by combining
their training data, i.e., v(S) = G(V,∪i∈SXi), where Xi is
the ith party’s training data. When the characteristic func-
tion depends on the maximum number of participants, we
overload the notation and use w(S,M) to denote the value
parties in the set S ⊆ M bring to the market with partici-
pants in M.
If parties are to be compensated for helping to solve a
machine learning task, it is natural to ask what a fair payoff
for each parties’ effort is. To this end, we consider Shap-
ley values (Shapley 1953), i.e., unique payoffs, studied in
game theory for collaborative games, that satisfy certain nat-
ural fairness properties discussed later. The Shapley value
for characteristic function v and party i ∈M is
ψ(v, i)=
∑
S⊆M\{i}
|S|!(M − |S| − 1)!
M !
(
v(S∪{i})−v(S)), (1)
i.e., ψ(v, i) quantifies the average marginal contribution of
party i wrt all possible subsets of parties. If v(M) 6= 1,
Shapley values can be normalized to sum to 1 by scaling
them by 1/v(M). When clear from the context which char-
acteristic function is used, we useψ(i). For a fixed character-
istic function v, Shapley values ψ(i) are the unique payoffs
satisfying properties of efficiency, symmetry, linearity and
null player (explained in §3.1). These properties ensure that
parties are paid equally for equal contributions and all gains
are distributed among the parties.
We will use Shapley values with different characteristic
functions in our marketplace: u for deciding which data to
use for training customized models (§5) vs. v andw for com-
puting the payoffs for single validation tasks (§4.1) and mul-
tiple validation tasks (§4.2) respectively. This is necessary as
Shapley value itself is not robust to replication.
3 A Collaborative Marketplace
In our marketplace, we consider M parties P1, . . . , PM
which aim to collaborate towards training machine learn-
ing models for their tasks. Each party simultaneously takes
the role of a seller and a buyer. The ith party has train-
ing data Xi and validation data Vi. The performance of
a machine learning model M(X ) trained on some train-
ing data X is evaluated using a performance/gain function
G(Vi,M(X )) ∈ [0, 1].
The goal of the market is to provide party i with a cus-
tomized model trained on the subset of (or potentially all)
datasets of other parties’ that best fits its task (based on Vi).
At the same time the market uses Xi to train models of par-
ties where this dataset fits the corresponding task (based on
validation data of other parties).
Definition 1 (Marketplace). A marketplace is a tuple
(P,PD), where P = (P1, . . . , PM ) is the list of parties en-
gaging with the market place and PD is the payment division
function.
We consider the following interaction with the data mar-
ketplace:
1. Parties P1, . . . , PM arrive.
2. The marketplace collects all training data sets
X1, . . . ,XM and validation tasks V1, . . . ,VM .
3. Every party pays the market a participation fee Ai that
is determined proportional to unit increase in personal
performance gain Ai = 1 − G(Vi,M(Xi)), i.e., valu-
ation for increasing performance to 100% on their val-
idation data. The market can also set a fixed value for
a unit increase c > 0 in performance, such that Ai =
c · (1− G(Vi,M(Xi))).
4. The marketplace trains a machine learning modelMi for
every party i where Mi = M(Vi,⊕j∈SiXj) and Si ⊆
M.
5. The model Mi is shared with party i. Let ai =
G(Vi,Mi) − G(Vi,M(Xi)). Party i receives payoff ti
which depends on the increase in performance on its vali-
dation data Vi (i.e., they receiveAi−ai) and how much its
data helps in improving performance of models for other
validation tasks, bi. Hence, in total party i gains (or loses)
(Ai − ai) + bi −Ai = bi − ai.
3.1 Desired Properties
In the following we enumerate desired properties for a ma-
chine learning marketplace such that participating parties re-
ceive fair payoffs for their engagement and benefit from par-
ticipation.
Revenue division and payment. Our list of properties is
inspired by the “standard axioms of fairness” since they
are the de facto method to assess the marginal value of
goods (i.e., features in our setting) in a cooperative game
(i.e., prediction task in our setting). They include: Balance:∑
bi =
∑
ai. Symmetry: if two parties i and j enter the
market with same training and validation sets then the their
payoff, ti = tj . Zero element buyer: if there is a party whose
performance does not increase, it should at least get its par-
ticipation fee back, ti = Ai.
Incentives. Party i decides on whether to enter the col-
laborative market or not and what Vi and Xi to contribute.
As a result, the marketplace should incentivize the parties to
join the market with good training data and honest validation
data:
Joining the market: The market should incentivize new
parties to join. Our setting incentivizes this as follows. A
new party brings a new task to the market, hence, existing
parties’ data may be useful for this task, increasing their
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payoff bi. At the same time, the new party is also bringing
new training data which can increase performance of tasks
submitted in the existing market, resulting in an increased
payoff. Hence a party joining the market can benefit from
increased utility.
Validation data: A dishonest party can try to manipulate
training and validation data (including their relationship) in
order to gain more than it would with its true training and
validation datasets. For example, Vi can be seen as an im-
plicit bid that party i places on the model Mi it will ob-
tain. There can be a case that G(V ′,Mi)−G(V ′,M(Xi)) >
G(Vi,Mi)− G(Vi,M(Xi)).
If it is the case, Mi has higher utility than what is de-
termined by Vi. To this end, the marketplace needs to ensure
that the modelMi that is returned to the party does not allow
for existence of V ′ in the current marketplace, incentivizing
the party to provide the best Vi to get the best utility model.
We enforce this incentive by training models that are cus-
tomized for a specific task, i.e., maximizing their accuracy
towards a specific task while minimizing their accuracy on
all other tasks in the market.
Training data: The market needs to ensure that the pay-
ment bi that party i receives for the use of its data to train
other models incentivizes it to provide its best Xi. We note
that our market does not have an explicit way for parties to
bid or price training data.
Robustness to replication. Parties may not behave hon-
estly and may replicate their data and create new replica par-
ties to join the market on their behalf. The market should be
robust to replication. That is, a party that replicates its train-
ing data should not earn more than it would in the original
market. This is a crucial property for any data market since
data as compared to physical goods is easily replicable. This
problem was already highlighted for a different marketplace
setup in (Agarwal, Dahleh, and Sarkar 2019).
Privacy and Integrity. Since data can be easily leaked
and manipulated compared to physical goods, the market
should provide assurance to its participants about the correct
handling of their data and model training. At the very least it
should ensure that information about the training data Xi of
party i is revealed only to other parties through models for
validation tasks where ith training data is useful. The infor-
mation about Vi has to be kept secret as well. As we men-
tion in the introduction, these properties can be provided if
the market infrastructure is instantiated using Trusted Exe-
cution Environments (or enclaves): parties submit their data
encrypted and allow only attested (verified) code to decrypt,
compute on it, and finally encrypt the models under the
encryption keys of the parties who can access these mod-
els (i.e., the party who specified the validation data for this
model).
4 Market Instantiations
We provide market instantiations for both a single validation
task among all the parties and multiple validation tasks.
4.1 Single Validation Task
Let us describe the marketplace for a single validation task V
that all M parties agree on. We slightly abuse the notation
by letting MS = M(⊕k∈SXk) be the model trained on
data from parties in S for task V . The parties agree on the
same marginal payment per increase of the model perfor-
mance they gain (for example, per percentage increase): if
G(V,MM) = 1 then party i pays the amount proportional
to Ai = 1 − G(V,Mi). Hence, the largest amount that can
be distributed among market participants is
∑
i∈MAi. Re-
call that, when entering the market the party submits Xi and
fee Ai. After the market completes, i obtainsMM and pay-
out bi ≥ 0.
In §5 we explain how to trainMM from parties’ datasets
and here describe how we instantiate the market, compute
the payoffs using Shapley and show that the market is robust
to replication.
Characteristic Function. Our characteristic function cap-
tures the value of data to parties in a set S for the task V as
the value of the model trained on the data as well as the value
the model brings to every party. As a result the characteristic
function for this market is defined as
v(S) = G(V;MS)︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of the model
+
∑
j∈S
[G(V;MS)− G(V;Mj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
model value for party j
]
(2)
This function can be seen as the value of the model trained
on the datasets of all parties in S plus the marginal gains for
each party. Note that for a single party the value of the data
is expressed as the value of the model trained on its own
training dataset.
Payment Division. The total amount, a, that is distributed
among the participants depends on the individual gains
obtained from the final model. Let ai = G(V,MM) −
G(V,Mi). Then, a =
∑
i∈M ai. We use (normalized) Shap-
ley values for characteristic function v to determine the dis-
tribution of a to each party i: bi = a × ψ(v, i). To simplify
the notation we use ψ(i) to denote ψ(v, i). In total, party i
obtains ti = (Ai−ai)+bi where (Ai−ai) is the return of the
original investment if the final model performance is not 1.
Hence, party i gains/loses the following amount by partici-
pating in the market: (Ai−ai)+bi−Ai = ψ(i)a−ai. Note
that i gets ψ(i) portion from each aj and it pays 1 − ψ(i)
of ai to the market.
Properties. Our single-task market has the following
properties: Balance:
∑
i(bi−ai) =
∑
i a×ψ(i)−
∑
i ai =
a× 1− a = 0. Symmetry: This follows from using Shapley
value to calculate payout bi and ai would be the same for
the parties with same data. Zero element buyer: If i does not
benefit from other parties, that is G(V,Mi) = G(V,MM),
then Ai is returned to i since ai = 0.
Robustness to replication. Recall that a market is robust
if a party does not gain a higher payoff in the market with
the replicas compared to its gain in the original market.
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Let us consider the total payoff of i when it replicates it-
self once. Let a and aR be the values of the original and
replicated markets. By definition, aR = a+ ai. Let t denote
i’s payoff in the original market and tR be its total payoff
when it replicates itself. Similarly, let ψ(·) and ψR(·) de-
note Shapley values before and after replication. tR = 2 ×
ψR(i)(aR−ai)−2×(1−ψR(i))ai = 2×(ψR(i)aR−ai). In
the market where each party is equivalent, that is ∀k, ak = a,
replication does not help. Using the symmetry property of
Shapley value we can show that tR = 0.
Let us consider the case when the contributions of the par-
ties are different. Recall that: t = ψ(i)a− ai and tR = 2×
(ψR(i)(a+ ai)− ai). Replication is useful to party i only if
t < tR. If this is the case, then: ψ(i)a+ai < 2ψR(i)(a+ai)
should hold.
Condition 1. The market in §4 is robust to replication if
ψR(i) ≤ ψ(i)a+ai2(a+ai) .
We show that our single-task market instantiation is robust
to replication as long as the gain function G has the proper-
ties outlined in §2. Our proof proceeds as follows. We first
derive the payoff that i needs to make in the replicated mar-
ket in order to break even. We then determine the marginal
contribution of party i for new coalitions that are created due
to the addition of its replica i′ (see Lemma 4 in Appendix).
We then devise the relationship between the Shapley values
of party i before and after replication. Finally we show that
the Shapley value of i in the new replicated market satisfies
the condition of robustness to replication, yielding the fol-
lowing theorem (proof details are provided in the appendix):
Theorem 1. The single-task market instantiation in §4.1 is
robust to replication as per Condition 1.
4.2 Multiple Validation tasks
The market setup is similar to the single task market where
there is a task from each party, Vi. Similarly when entering
the market the party submits Xi and feeAi. After the market
completes, i obtainsMiM and payout bi ≥ 0. In §5 we ex-
plain how to train an individualMiM from parties’ datasets
and use the rest of the section to describe how we instantiate
the market and compute the payoffs.
Characteristic Function. Let D ⊆M be a set of indices
of the distinct validation tasks, i.e., for every i ∈M, there is
j ∈ D s.t. Vi = Vj . Then the characteristic function for the
multi-task market is defined as:
w(S,M) =
∑
i∈D
G(Vi;MiS)︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of models for distinct tasks
+
∑
i∈S
[G(Vi;MiS)− G(Vi;Mii)︸ ︷︷ ︸
value for party i
]
(3)
When clear from the context, we omit the second argument
of w(·, ·). We observe that this is a natural extension from
a single validation task: the goal of the market is to achieve
better performance on all (distinct) tasks of the market as
well as individually for each party. As we will see it also
helps with lowering the impact of replicated parties on the
value of the market: an addition of a replicated party will
affect only the second part of the value function while a party
with new data has a chance to contribute to both parts of the
characteristic function.
Payment division and properties. The payment division
is identical to the one for a single task market in §4.1 except
that w is used as the characteristic function when computing
the Shapley value.
Since the payment function is the same as in the single-
task market, the condition on robustness is also the same
and marginal contribution of i to coalitions that are created
due to its replication is limited in the same (see Lemma 6 in
Appendix).
Since multi-task market payout is defined in the same
manner as the one for single task, the following proper-
ties also hold: balance, zero element and symmetry. The
main difference is the computation of the characteristic func-
tion w. The multiple-task market is robust to replication as
we prove in the appendix.
Theorem 2. The multiple-task market instantiation in §4.2
is robust to replication as per Condition 1.
5 Training over Multi-Party Data
In this section, we describe (1) how to align the training data
provided by all parties for training models for different tasks,
i.e., select the relevant training data; and (2) how to train
a model for party i such that it performs well only on its
corresponding task and not other tasks in the market.
Training Data Selection. With multi-party data we need
to select the right training data for training each parties’
model. To this end, we also make use of Shapley val-
ues. Note that this step happens prior to the computa-
tion of the payoffs which again involves the computation
of Shapley values but for a different characteristic func-
tion. For training data selection for party i we follow two
steps: (1) Compute the Shapley values ψ(ui, i) for ui(S) =
G(Vi,M(∪j∈SXj)). (2) Determine the relevant data for the
task of party i as Di = {j ∈ M | ψ(ui, j) ≥ τ}, where
τ is a threshold that can be used to control the amount of
used training data. Note that the above steps can be trivially
applied on a sample-level instead of a dataset-level. Com-
puting sample-level Shapley value would typically result in
better model performance at increased computational cost
for deciding on the training data to use. In the case of a sin-
gle common validation set, Di = Dj , ∀i 6= j.
The characteristic functions used for computing payoffs
in §4.2 are computed using only relevant training data. In
particular, when computing Shapley values for determining
each parties’ payoff, we use the shorthandMiS forMS∩Di .
Superscript is omitted for single validation task.
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Figure 2: Accuracy for MNIST dataset trained using logistic regression (two left plots) and a DNN (two right plots) with
replication of digit 0. Replication of other digits showed similar results.
Customized Model Training. To minimize usefulness of
the model provided to party i after interacting with the mar-
ket for other parties’ validation tasks, we adopt the following
strategy for training the model for party i: Party i receives
a model trained on the data of parties Di. Additionally the
model that party i receives is optimized for maximizing the
loss wrt all Vk for k 6= i, i.e.
min
θ
∑
j∈M\{i}
G(Vi,M(⊕k∈MXk)) (4)
s.t. G(Vi,M(⊕k∈MXk)) ≥ G∗ − ,
where G∗ = G(Vi,MiM) is the best performance achievable
on the validation data of party i by standard model train-
ing,  ≥ 0 is some constant, and θ are parameters of the
models, e.g., weights of a neural network. To avoid overfit-
ting to the validation data by using it during model train-
ing (we still need to resort to the validation data for pric-
ing) and have a straightforwardly approachable optimization
problem, we consider the proxy maxθ G(∪k∈DiXk,MiM)−
λ
∑
j 6=i G(Vj ,MiM),where λ > 0 is a hyperparameter. This
approach is evaluated in our experiments.
6 Experiments
We implemented a prototype of our marketplace and eval-
uated it on the task of classifying handwritten digits from
the MNIST dataset (LeCun et al. 1998). Here we validate
assumptions made in the paper and evaluate the effective-
ness of our marketplace setup. The goals of our evaluation
are: (i) Understand the effect of replicated training data on
the accuracy on validation data; (ii) Measure the (impor-
tance) value of training data towards a single validation task;
(iii) Calculate the payoffs with our payment division func-
tion for training data with and w/o replication and compare
them to those of the naive payment division; (iv) Evaluate
the effectiveness of an output model customized for a given
validation task.
6.1 Effect of Data Replication on ML models
We aim to understand how data replication affects model ac-
curacy and validate the assumption we made in §2. To this
end, we consider a collaboration among 10 parties for the
validation task of 10K images with all 10 digits. We mea-
sure the accuracy on this validation task on models that are
trained using the data from all parties. We train a logistic
regression model and a single hidden layer (500 neurons)
DNN model for 100 epochs with a learning rate of 10−2,
Adam optimizer and a value of 10−4 for `2 regularization.
In the initial setup, each party contributes 1000 images
corresponding to a single digit, which are randomly sampled
from the training data for this digit. To understand the effect
of replication, we compare the accuracy of the model trained
in the initial setup with the following replication configu-
rations. The party with digit 0 or 4, respectively, replicates
and creates new parties with the same 1000 images as their
training data. We vary the number of replicas from 0 to 50.
Hence, there will be 50,000 samples corresponding to the
digit 0 in the combined training dataset for 50 replicas. All
observations are similar for the replication of other digits.
In addition to the overall accuracy of the validation task, we
looked at the accuracy of the digits 0 and 4 present in the
validation dataset.
Results. Figure 2 shows results for a logistic regression
and a DNN model averaged over 50 runs (random draws
of training and validation data, and of the initial network
weights). The dotted and the solid lines denote the accuracy
over the number of replicas. For logistic regression, the ac-
curacy of classifying digit 0 increases initially with repli-
cation of digit 0 and then remains constant. This confirms
that replication does not necessarily benefit the accuracy of
the replicated digit on a model that is trained on sufficient
samples. On the other hand, the accuracy of classifying the
digit 0 decreases slightly with replication of 4. This result
shows that replication may hurt the accuracy of other vali-
dation tasks in the market. Finally, we observe that the ac-
curacy of the overall validation task of 10K images reduces
only slightly with the replication of both digits. The results
for DNNs show similar trends. Thus, in summary, the as-
sumptions needed for our theoretical results hold approxi-
mately in practice.
6.2 Customized Model Training
An important component of our marketplace is customized
model training, cf. §5, which consists of two steps: data se-
lection and model training. We empirically investigate both
steps here.
Training data selection. To understand the usefulness
6
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3: (a) Shapley values for parties contributing training data for validation tasks with all ten digits and only digits
(0, 1, 2, 3, 6, 8). Figures (b) and (c): Shapley values on validation dataset of digits (0,2,8) with replicating parties for char-
acteristic function u (accuracy) in (b) and our proposed characteristic function v (§4.1) in (c).
of training data with respect to a validation task, we con-
sider a setting where each party holds 2000 training sam-
ples for two randomly selected labels. As validation tasks,
we consider classification of all ten digits and classifying
digits (0, 1, 2, 3, 6, 8). Figure 3a shows the Shapley values
using characteristic function u for both validation tasks. For
all the digits in the validation data (label 0-9 in the figure),
we observe that the parties with unique labels such as 1,
2 and 6 have higher Shapley values indicating higher util-
ity of their training data. For the validation task on digits
(0, 1, 2, 3, 6, 8) we observe that the parties which do not con-
tribute any of these digits have zero Shapley values. This
confirms that Shapley values are well suited for selecting
training data for task-specific model training.
Model training. To evaluate the customized model train-
ing we considered a setting with ten parties in which each
party holds data for two different digits s.t. party j has data
for labels (j, (j + 1) mod 10) for j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 9}. For
party j the training data consists of all training samples from
the MNIST dataset with either of its two labels. The same
holds for its validation data with respect to the validation
data from MNIST. In Figure 4 we see results for applying
the customized model training approach when training a lo-
gistic regression model for the validation task of each party.
We observe that although the combined training points con-
sist of all the digits in MNIST, the model trained with our
approach is useful only for the specific validation task and
has mediocre performance on (other) validation tasks with
overlapping labels. That is, it is not useful to classify dig-
its from the remaining labels outside the specific validation
task.
6.3 Payoffs in Single Task Marketplace
We now empirically validate that our proposed characteris-
tic function v in §4.1 for computing payoffs is indeed robust
to replication. We also compare it to the case where Shap-
ley values are computed for characteristic function u (model
accuracy), cf. §5, which is not robust to replication. Here,
we consider two parties: Honest party P1 with digits (0,8),
and replicating party P2 with digits (2,8). P2 creates replicas
P3 to P6 with the same dataset. The single validation task is
(0, 1) (1, 2) (2, 3) (3, 4) (4, 5) (5, 6) (6, 7) (7, 8) (8, 9) (9, 0)
Training data
(0, 1)
(1, 2)
(2, 3)
(3, 4)
(4, 5)
(5, 6)
(6, 7)
(7, 8)
(8, 9)
(9, 0)
Va
lid
at
io
n 
ta
sk
0.93 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.49
0.48 0.94 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.46 0.92 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.49 0.95 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.92 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.92 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.92 0.43 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.92 0.49 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.93 0.45
0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.95
Figure 4: Classification accuracy of the customized models
for different validation tasks.
classification of digits 0,2,8. The parties combine their data
and train a logistic regression model.
Figure 3 shows Shapley values of our results as number
of replicas increases. We observe that the combined Shap-
ley value of the replicating parties increases with the num-
ber of replicas while that of the honest party P1 decreases
for u (Figure 3b) when using Shapley values with accuracy
as the characteristic function. In contrast, Figure 3c shows
that when Shapley values are instantiated with our new char-
acteristic function, Shapley values of P1 and the combined
values for the replicating parties are equal. This verifies that
replication does not benefit the replicating party when using
our single-task collaborative market instantiation.
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7 Related Work
Multiple lines of work are related to our proposed collabo-
rative machine learning markets framework. We organized
it into work on using Shapley values for valuating data for
model training and machine learning marketplaces. Also
general work on game theory and mechanism design is re-
lated to our work but not discussed here in detail, cf. (Nisan
et al. 2007) for an overview.
Shapley values for valuating data. Prior work has pro-
posed the use of Shapley values for characteristic func-
tion u to valuate data in machine learning settings. Most
of these works focus on the problem of efficiently approx-
imating Shapley values. Closest to ours, Agarwal, Dahleh,
and Sarkar (2019) uses Shapley values to compute pay-
offs in non-collaborative marketplace. Before that, Datta et
al. (2016) proposed the use of Shapley values to quantify
feature importance for classification problems, and proposed
sampling based approximations of Shapley values. Ghor-
bani et al. (2019) show that Shapley values are good met-
ric to quantify the usefulness of data for machine learn-
ing tasks. They show that valuating data for model training
based on Shapley value is better than using leave-one-out
cross-validation, and propose sampling and gradient based
approaches for approximating Shapley values. Also Jia et
al. (2019) propose several sampling based approaches and
the use of influence functions (Koh and Liang 2017) to re-
duce the computational cost of computing Shapley values.
Machine learning marketplaces. The closest to our pa-
per is work by Agarwal et al. (2019) who study an al-
gorithmic approach for data marketplaces. They propose
a general marketplace setup which makes use of Shapley
values for computing payoffs. The marketplace sets prices
for data in an online fashion and matches sellers to buy-
ers. They highlight the problem of data replication in com-
bination with Shapley values and propose to overcome it
heuristically by downweighing Shapley values according
to data similarity. Critically, their approach also reduces
payoffs for honest, i.e., non-replicating parties. In contrast,
we achieve robustness-to-replication naturally through the
multi-party setting in combination with novel characteris-
tic functions. Furthermore, in our marketplace no data is
given to any party, avoiding further reselling of the data
while in (Agarwal, Dahleh, and Sarkar 2019) this is pos-
sible. Other related work tries to price machine learning
models instead of data directly (Chen, Koutris, and Kumar
2018). In that work, a broker forms the interface between
data sellers and model buyers. Their main focus is to en-
sure affordability of models for all buyers by adjusting the
model’s performance through noise-injection and prevention
of arbitrage. Abernethy and Frongillo (2011) study incen-
tive mechanisms in the setting where solving a task (e.g.,
ML prediction) is done in a collaborative decentralized man-
ner with parties contributing towards solving the task with
their expertise (e.g., improvements to a classifier), as op-
posed to contributing data. Marketplaces that treat data sim-
ilar to classical goods are available at (Big Data Exchange ;
QLik Data Market ).
8 Future Work
We consider the following extensions of our work: Perfor-
mance: Improve the time to select training data using opti-
mizations for evaluation of Shapley values such as sampling
or influence functions (Koh and Liang 2017; Jia et al. 2019;
Ghorbani and Zou 2019). Data Privacy: Use differential pri-
vacy techniques to strengthen privacy of training data in the
customized models, as a result mitigating model inversion or
membership inference attacks on the output model (Shokri
et al. 2017; Fredrikson, Jha, and Ristenpart 2015). Itera-
tive Market: Consider marketplace properties when the par-
ties interact with the market over multiple rounds. Iterative
markets would allow parties to learn additional information
about the market such as the type of validation tasks and
training data available, which might give advantage to ad-
versarial parties.
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A Proof Details
We show that our market instantiations are robust to replication. Recall that a market is robust if there is no party that gains
a higher payoff in the market with its replicas compared to its gain in the original market (Condition 1). Let i be the party
that replicates itself. Our proof proceeds as follows. In Lemma 1, we use the Shapley value of party i before replication (ψi)
to bound the Shapley value of party i after replication (ψRi ) and show that the bound holds under several assumptions on the
characteristic function v. We then show that, if ψR is bounded as it is in Lemma 1, then the market is robust to replication
(Lemma 2). Finally, we prove that the characteristic functions for the single validation task market (Equation 2) and multiple
validations task market (Equation 3) and corresponding Shapley values satisfy conditions of Lemma 2 and hence are both
robust-to-replication (Theorems 1 and 2).
In this section we outline lemmas that hold for both market instantiations and in the following sections show that assumptions
of the lemma statements indeed hold for the single- and multiple-validation-task markets.
Lemma 1. In a collaborative ML market with parties in set M, let ai be the gain that party i obtains for its own task by
participating in the market. Let v(S,M) be a characteristic function of the value of parties in S ⊆ M with the following
properties: (1) v(S,M) = v(S,MR), ∀S ⊆M, where MR are the same parties as in the original market along with a replica
of party i ∈ M, i′. (2) v(S ∪ {i},MR) − v(S,MR) ≤ ai where i′ ∈ S and i′ is a replica of i. (3) v is supermodular. Let ψ
and ψR be the Shapley values of the original market and the market with i’s replica, then:
ψR(i) ≤ ψ(i)v(M,M)
2v(MR)
+
ai
2v(MR,MR)
=
ψ(i)v(M,M) + ai
2v(MR,MR)
Proof. Let us express ψR(i) in terms of ψ. Compare the coalition subsets S between the two values. All the new subsets in ψR
will contain the replica of i and, by the assumption of the lemma, for such subsets v(S ∪ i,MR)− v(S,MR) = ai. The other
subsets are the same as in ψ except their value towards the overall Shapley value decreases. Let ψR(i) = ψRold(i) + ψ
R
new(i)
where ψRold is the value brought from old (coalition) subsets and ψ
R
new from the new ones.
Bounding ψRold(i): Since v(S,M) = v(S,MR) for all subsets S where replica i′ is not present (i.e., those subsets used in
computing ψRold), we omit the second argument of v to simplify the notation.
Recall that the (normalized) Shapley values of the subsets that existed before replication for both markets are:
ψ(i)=
1
v(M)
∑
S⊆M\{i}
|S|!(M − |S| − 1)!
M !
(
v(S∪{i})−v(S))
ψRold(i)=
1
v(MR)
∑
S⊆M\{i}
|S|!(M − |S|)!
(M + 1)!
(
v(S∪{i})−v(S))
We need to show that
ψRold(i) =
1
v(MR)
∑
S⊆M\{i}
|S|!(M − |S|)!
(M + 1)!
(
v(S∪{i})−v(S)) ≤ ψ(i)v(M)
2v(MR)
(5)
Simplifying the inequality and substituting ψ(v):∑
S⊆M\{i}
|S|!(M − |S|)!
(M + 1)!
(
v(S∪{i})−v(S)) ≤ ψ(i)v(M)
2∑
S⊆M\{i}
|S|!(M − |S|)!
(M + 1)!
(
v(S∪{i})−v(S)) ≤ 1
v(M)
∑
S⊆M\{i}
|S|!(M − |S| − 1)!
M !
(
v(S∪{i})−v(S))v(M)
2∑
S⊆M\{i}
|S|!(M − |S|)!
(M + 1)!
(
v(S∪{i})−v(S)) ≤ 1
2
∑
S⊆M\{i}
|S|!(M − |S| − 1)!
M !
(
v(S∪{i})−v(S))
∑
S⊆M\{i}
|S|!(M − |S|)!
(M + 1)
(
v(S∪{i})−v(S)) ≤ 1
2
∑
S⊆M\{i}
|S|!(M − |S| − 1)!(v(S∪{i})−v(S))
∑
S⊆M\{i}
|S|!(M − |S|+ 1)!(M − 2|S| − 1)(v(S∪{i})−v(S)) ≤ 0
Note that coefficients M − 2|S| − 1 are symmetric for sets |R| < bM/2c and |Q| = M − |R| − 1: M − 2|R| − 1 =
−(M − 2|Q| − 1). There are (M−1|R| ) sets of size |R| and ( M−1M−|R|−1) of size M − |R| − 1. Note that (M−1|R| ) = ( M−1M−|R|−1).
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Hence, the number of sets is the same and we are left to define a one-to-one mapping, s.t., for every set R there is a set Q,
R ⊂ Q. If this mapping exists, then we can use supermodularity property of v: v(R ∪ {i})− v(R) ≤ v(Q ∪ {i})− v(Q), and
the inequality is satisfied.
To define the mapping, we represent sets as a bipartite graph (X,Y ) where vertices in X represent all sets of size |R| and
vertices in Y represent all sets of size |Q|. For every R ⊂ Q, we add an edge between the vertices that correspond to these two
sets. Note that every vertex in X and Y is connected to
(
M−|R|−1
M−2|R|−1
)
vertices (i.e., we are counting the number of sets of size
M − |R| − 1 that contain subset R and where other elements are chosen from the remaining M − |R| − 1 elements).
Hall’s marriage theorem states that there is a matching where every vertex x ∈ X is matched if and only if |W | ≤ |N(W )| for
every W ⊆ X and where N(W ) ⊆ Y denotes neighbors of vertices in W . We prove that this is the case by construction. Take
a vertex x ∈ X and initializeW = {x}. Note that |N(W )| = (M−|R|−1
M−2|R|−1
)
. We proceed by expandingW with arbitrary vertices
fromX . We note that the total number of edges betweenW andN(W ) is always |W |×(M−|R|−1
M−2|R|−1
)
. For every vertex x′ that is
added there are two possibilities: either x′ contains same elements as sets already in W , in which case N(W ) = N(W ∪{x′}),
orN(W ) ⊂ N(W ∪{x′}) as sets that cover the new elements are added. Suppose we are at the stage when |W | = |N(W )|. We
prove that there is no x′ ∈ X s.t. |N(W )| = |N(W ∪{x′})| and, hence,W cannot be expanded without also expandingN(W ).
Note that if |W | = |N(W )| each vertex in N(W ) must be connected to (M−|R|−1
M−2|R|−1
)
vertices in W to satisfy the constraint
on the number of edges from a vertex in Y to X . Hence, there cannot be a vertex in X that has edges to N(W ) as this would
exceed the per-vertex number of edges constraint. Hence, x′ does not exist. Since |X| = |Y | and there is a matching where
every vertex in X is matched according to Hall’s theorem, there is a mapping between every vertex in X and Y .
Computing ψRnew(i): Let us now show that ψRnew(i) =
ai
2v(MR)
, where we denote the number of coalitions of size s without
party i in the market with M parties using, ns,M :
ns,M =
(
M − 1
s
)
Each new coalition in the new marketplace contains i′. The number of such new subsets is
nM,M+1 +
M−1∑
s=1
ns,M+1 − ns,M = 1 +
M−1∑
s=1
ns,M+1 − ns,M
Since marginal contribution of i in the new coalitions will be limited to ai by the property of v, the overall value that these
subsets bring to ψR(i) is:
ψRnew = ai
1
M + 1
1
v(MR)
(
1 +
M−1∑
s=1
ns,M+1 − ns,M
ns,M+1
)
=
ai
1
M + 1
1
v(MR)
(
1 +
M − 1
2
)
= ai
1
M + 1
1
v(MR)
M + 1
2
=
ai
2v(MR)
(6)
(see Claim 1 for the expansion of the subset combinations).
Then substituting derivations 5 and 6 into ψR(i), we obtain the statement of the lemma.
Corollary 1. If ai = 0, then ψR(i) ≤ ψ(i)v(M)2v(M) = ψ(i)2 .
Lemma 2. In a collaborative ML market with parties in set M, let ai be the gain that party i obtains for its own task by
participating in the market. Let v be the characteristic function s.t. v(M) ≥∑j∈M aj and v(MR) = v(M) + ai, where MR
consists of the same parties as M along with a replica of i. If ψR ≤ ψ(i)v(M,M)+ai
2v(MR,MR)
for every party i, then the market is robust
to replication as per Condition 1.
Proof. Let us prove the contrary that the market is not robust to replication and hence Condition 1 is false, i.e., that
ψR(i) >
ψ(i)a+ ai
2(a+ ai)
where a =
∑
j∈M aj .
Substituting ψR in Condition 1 and using the property that v(MR) = v(M) + ai, we obtain
ψ(i)
a
2(a+ ai)
+
ai
2(a+ ai)
< ψ(i)
v(M)
2(v(M) + ai)
+
ai
2(v(M) + ai)
ψ(i)a+ ai
a+ ai
<
ψ(i)v(M) + ai
v(M) + ai
(7)
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Let c = v(M)− a, where c ≥ 0 by the property of v. Then, substituting v(M):
ψ(i)a+ ai
a+ ai
<
ψ(i)(a+ c) + ai
a+ c+ ai
a+ c+ ai
a+ ai
<
ψ(i)(a+ c) + ai
ψ(i)a+ ai
Let x = 1/ψ(i) ≥ 1, then
a+ c+ ai
a+ ai
<
a+ c+ xai
a+ xai
Let p = a+c+aia+ai , then a+ c+ ai = p(a+ ai). Since c ≥ 0, ai ≥ 0, p ≥ 1. We need to show that
p <
a+ c+ xai
a+ xai
=
p(a+ ai)− ai + xai
a+ xai
p(a+ xai) < p(a+ ai)− ai + xai
pxai < pai − ai + xai
px < p+ x− 1
However, px ≥ p+ x− 1 for p, x ≥ 1 and we arrive to contradiction.
Claim 1.
∑M−1
s=1
ns,M+1−ns,M
ns,M+1
= 1M
(M−1)M
2 =
M−1
2 .
Proof.
(ns,M+1 − ns,M )
ns,M+1
=
(
M
s
)− (M−1s )(
M
s
) = 1− (M−1s )(
M
s
) = 1− (M − 1)!s!(M − s)!
s!(M − s− 1)!M ! = 1−
M − s
M
=
s
M
and
M−1∑
s=1
(
M
s
)− (M−1s )(
M
s
) ) = M−1∑
s=1
s
M
=
1
M
(M − 1)M
2
=
M − 1
2
B Single Validation Task: Proof Details
Lemma 3. Let v be the characteristic function as defined in Equation 2. Then if G is monotonic and supermodular, v is
supermodular.
Proof. We want to show that for sets R ⊂ Q, i 6∈ Q, v(R ∪ {i})− v(R) ≤ v(Q ∪ {i})− v(Q). Recall that v(S) is defined as
v(S) = G(V;MS) +∑j∈S [G(V;MS)− G(V;Mj)]. Then v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) is
G(V;MS∪{i}) + ∑
j∈S∪{i}
[G(V;MS∪{i})− G(V;Mj)]− G(V;MS)−∑
j∈S
[G(V;MS)− G(V;Mj)] =
(|S|+ 1)[G(V;MS∪{i})− G(V;MS)] + [G(V;MS∪{i})− G(V;Mi)].
Since G is monotone, non-negative, supermodular and R ⊂ Q,
(|R|+ 1)[G(V;MR∪{i})− G(V;MR)] ≤ (|Q|+ 1)[G(V;MQ∪{i})− G(V;MQ)].
Because of monotonicity, this implies
(|R|+ 1)[G(V;MR∪{i})− G(V;MR)] ≤ (|Q|+ 1)[G(V;MQ∪{i})− G(V;MQ)] + G(V;MQ∪{i})− G(V;MR∪{i})︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
.
Rearranging terms and comparing with the equation above yields the statement of the lemma.
Lemma 4. Let v be the characteristic function as defined in Equation 2 where G’s value does not change with replicated data,
and i′ be a replica party of i. Then v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) ≤ ai for any set S when i′ ∈ S.
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Proof. Let us expand v(S ∪ {i}) using the property of the gain function that states that replication does not change its value
(i.e., G(V;MS∪{i}) = G(V;MS)):
v(S ∪ {i}) = G(V;MS∪{i}) + ∑
j∈S∪{i}
[G(V;MS∪{i})− G(V;Mj)] =
G(V;MS) + ∑
j∈S∪{i}
[G(V;MS)− G(V;Mj)]
Then
v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)
= G(V;MS) + ∑
j∈S∪{i}
[G(V;MS)− G(V;Mj)]
−G(V;MS)−∑
j∈S
[G(V;MS)− G(V;Mj)]
= G(V;MS)− G(V;Mi) ≤ ai
Theorem 1. The single-task market instantiation in §4.1 is robust to replication as per Condition 1.
Proof. Single task market uses a characteristic function v that satisfies properties of Lemma 1: (1) v(S,M) = v(S,MR), ∀S ⊆
M, since v depends only on S and not the second argument. (2) v(S∪{i},MR)−v(S,MR) ≤ ai holds as per Lemma 4 where
second argument of v is omitted to simplify the notation. (3) v is supermodular as shown in Lemma 3. Hence, ψR is bounded
as in Lemma 1. Furthermore, v satisfies properties of Lemma 2: since v(S) = G(V;MS) +∑j∈S [G(V;MS)− G(V;Mj)]
and ai = G(V,MM)−G(V,Mi), v(M) = G
(V;MS)+∑j∈M aj ≥∑j∈M aj . The second property, v(MR) = v(M)+ai,
holds due to the property of G on replicated data:
v(MR) = G(V;MMR)+ ∑
j∈MR
[G(V;MMR)− G(V;Mj)] = G(V;MM)+ ∑
j∈MR
[G(V;MM)− G(V;Mj)] = v(M)+ai.
Single task market instantiation satisfies properties of Lemma 2 on v and ψR and, hence, is robust to replication.
C Multiple Validation Tasks: Proof Details
Lemma 5. Let w be the characteristic function as defined in Equation 3. Then if G is monotonic and supermodular, w is
supermodular.
Proof. We want to show that for sets R ⊂ Q, w(R ∪ {i}) − w(R) ≤ w(Q ∪ {i}) − w(Q), where the second argument is
omitted since w has the same dependency on M for all sets in the same market instantiation.
Recall that w is defined as:
w(S ∪ {i}) =
∑
j∈D
G(Vj ;MjS∪{i}) + ∑
j∈S∪{i}
[G(Vj ;MjS∪{i})− G(Vj ;Mjj)]
Then w(S ∪ {i})− w(S) is:∑
j∈D
G(Vj ;MjS∪{i}) + ∑
j∈S∪{i}
[G(Vj ;MjS∪{i})− G(Vj ;Mjj)]−∑
i∈D
G(Vi;MiS)−∑
i∈S
[G(Vi;MiS)− G(Vi;Mii)] =∑
j∈D
(G(Vj ;MjS∪{i})− G(Vi;MiS)) +∑
j∈S
[G(Vj ;MjS∪{i})− G(Vi;MiS)]+ [G(Vi;MiS∪{i})− G(Vi;Mii)]
Hence, v(R ∪ {i})− v(R) ≤ v(Q ∪ {i})− v(Q) can be written as follows:∑
j∈D
(G(Vj ;MjR∪{i})− G(Vi;MiR)) +∑
j∈R
[G(Vj ;MjR∪{i})− G(Vi;MiR)]+ [G(Vi;MiR∪{i})] ≤∑
j∈D
(G(Vj ;MjQ∪{i})− G(Vi;MiQ)) + ∑
j∈Q
[G(Vj ;MjQ∪{i})− G(Vi;MiQ)]+ [G(Vi;MiQ∪{i})]
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Since G is monotonic:∑
j∈D
(G(Vj ;MjR∪{i})− G(Vi;MiR)) +∑
j∈R
[G(Vj ;MjR∪{i})− G(Vi;MiR)] ≤∑
j∈D
(G(Vj ;MjQ∪{i})− G(Vi;MiQ)) + ∑
j∈Q
[G(Vj ;MjQ∪{i})− G(Vi;MiQ)]
The inequality holds, as long as G is supermodular.
Lemma 6. Let w be the characteristic function as defined in Equation 3 where G’s value does not change with replicated data,
and i′ be a replica party of i. Then w(S ∪ {i},M)− w(S,M) ≤ ai for any set S ⊂M when i′ ∈ S.
Proof. We omit the second argument of w to simplify the notation. Consider the following values of w where we use the
property of the gain function that states that replication does not change its value (i.e., G(V;MS∪{i}) = G(V;MS)):
w(S ∪ i) =
∑
j∈D
G(Vj ;Mj(S,i)) + ∑
j∈S,i
[G(Vj ;Mj(S,i))− G(Vj ;Mjj)]
w(S ∪ i, i′) =
∑
j∈D
G(Vj ;Mj(S,i,i′)) + ∑
j∈S,i,i′
[G(Vj ;Mj(S,i,i′))− G(Vj ;Mjj)]
=
∑
j∈D
G(Vj ;Mj(S,i)) + ∑
j∈S,i,i′
[G(Vj ;Mj(S,i))− G(Vj ;Mjj)]
Then
w(S ∪ i, i′)− w(S ∪ i) = ∑
j∈D
G(Vj ;Mj(S,i)) + ∑
j∈S,i,i′
[G(Vj ;Mj(S,i))− G(Vj ;Mjj)]
−
∑
j∈D
G(Vj ;Mj(S,i))− ∑
j∈S,i
[G(Vj ;Mj(S,i))− G(Vj ;Mjj)] =[G(Vi;Mj(S,i))− G(Vi;Mji )] = ai
Theorem 2. The multiple-task market instantiation in §4.2 is robust to replication as per Condition 1.
Proof. Multiple task market uses a characteristic function w that satisfies properties of Lemma 1: (1) w(S,M) = w(S,MR),
∀S ⊆ M, since w depends only on S and distinct validation tasks that are the same for MR and M since Vi′ = Vi. (2)
w(S∪{i},MR)−w(S,MR) ≤ ai holds as per Lemma 6. (3) w is supermodular as shown in Lemma 5. Hence, ψR is bounded
as in Lemma 1. Furthermore, w satisfies properties of Lemma 2: since
w(S) =
∑
i∈D
G(Vi;MiS) +∑
i∈S
[G(Vi;MiS)− G(Vi;Mii)]
and ai = G
(Vi;MiS)− G(Vi;Mii), w(M) = ∑i∈D G(Vi;MiS) +∑j∈M aj ≥∑j∈M aj .
The second property, w(MR) = w(M) + ai, holds due to the property of G on replicated data:
w(MR) =
∑
i∈D
G(Vi;MiMR) + ∑
i∈MR
[G(Vi;MiMR)− G(Vi;Mii)] =∑
i∈D
G(Vi;MiM) + ∑
i∈MR
[G(Vi;MiM)− G(Vi;Mii)] = w(M) + ai.
Multiple task market instantiation satisfies properties of Lemma 2 on w and ψR and, hence, is robust to replication.
14
